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Chapter 11 
Organizational Change in International Bureaucracies 
Michael Bauer, Helge Jörgens, and Christoph Knill 
 
Introduction 
International organizations are important participants in the realm of world politics. An area in 
which this has become highly visible is the field of United Nations peace operations. Since the 
end of the Cold War, UN peace operations have increased in number, geographical focus, as well 
as in their overall complexity.1 Numerous case studies on more recent UN peacekeeping 
missions show how their scope as well as their level of ambition is moving well beyond the 
principles of earlier peacekeeping missions. In the most complex cases, the presence of 
international organizations has begun to assume the character of de facto protectorates,2 with 
international organizations such as the UN, the European Union (EU), or the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) imposing globalized models of public administration upon “failed” 
or war-torn states. In the literature, this establishment of transitional administrations is described 
as “humanitarian occupation,”3 “benevolent foreign autocracy,”4 “international protectorates,”5 
or simply as “international administrations,”6 a terminology that points to the paradoxical fact 
that international organizations have gone as far as to temporarily assume the powers of national 
governments, thereby, turning traditional perceptions of sovereignty and of the relationship 
between (some) nation states and intergovernmental organizations upside down.7  
So far, much of the scholarly analysis of the changing role of international organizations 
in international politics has focused on high-level intergovernmental decision-making among 
member states. Consequently, with regard to UN peace operations, most studies have focused on 
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the role of the UN Security Council.8. Significantly less attention has been paid to changes of the 
internal structures, administrative procedures, and self-perceptions of international organizations. 
As a consequence, virtually nothing is known about the impacts these changes may have on the 
performance of international organizations. In other words, the dynamics as well as the impacts 
of administrative reform in international bureaucracies constitute a blind spot in international 
relations and public administration research.  
Against this background, the authors argue in this chapter that in order to fully 
understand the role of international organizations in international peace operations, the dominant 
inter-governmental and inter-organizational perspective has to be complemented by an 
organizational perspective that 1) systematically explores how the internal structure and culture 
of international organizations changes and 2) develops hypotheses as to how these changes may 
affect organizational performance. Thus, while more traditional approaches to international 
relations would explain the changing role of international organizations in the field of peace 
operations, mainly as a result of changing state preferences in the aftermath of the Cold War,9 an 
organizational perspective adds changes within the administrative corpus of international 
organizations as a further and independent category of explanatory factors.10 Often, these 
changes result from organizational learning (see the other contributions in the Learning Section 
of this volume). However, as Thorsten Benner et al. note in chapter 10, organizational learning is 
only one among several potential causes of change and reform in international organizations. 11 
Other potential causes of administrative reform include, for example, changes in the membership 
or the voting rules of international organizations, changes in their leadership, the imitation of 
organizational traits observed elsewhere, or the external imposition of organizational models by 
other, more powerful, actors. By opening its focus to the entirety of factors and mechanisms that 
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promote or obstruct administrative reform in international organizations, this chapter sketches 
out the broader context within which processes of organizational learning may occur. 
Although the “organizational turn”12 in the study of international organizations is still in 
its infancy, scholars in the area of peace operations have slowly begun to incorporate internal 
organizational dynamics in their analyses. For example, in an empirical study on UN 
peacekeeping in civil wars, Lise Morjé Howard observes that part of the changes in UN 
operations during the 1990s can be explained by an increased political and managerial autonomy 
of multilateral organizations vis-à-vis their member states: 
 
There is indeed mounting evidence that the Secretariat often now functions as something 
significantly more than a talk shop or the handmaiden of the Security Council, and that it 
is even beginning to take on state-like qualities. For example, in many peacekeeping 
operations, members of the Secretariat are in positions to make foreign policy and even 
life and death decisions for people in states emerging from civil war.13  
 
From a learning perspective, Thorsten Benner et al. have begun to analyze the emergence of an 
internal infrastructure for organizational learning in the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.14 They 
find that, only belatedly, systematic management reforms have been initiated which are aimed at 
improving the UN’s institutional memory and promoting processes of institutional learning 
within that organization. However, as Seibel et al. point out in chapter 1 of this volume, the 
success or failure of organizational change and learning in the area of peacekeeping and the 
establishment of transitional administrations can only be explained adequately if one takes into 
account the specific governance structure of international peace operations, its inner and outer 
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organizational environment (see chapter 8 by Berthoin Antal, Junk, and Schumann in this 
volume). This governance structure is characterized by a complex and often problematic 
interplay between the intergovernmental arena, where states act according to their perceived 
national interests, and the organizational arena, where international bureaucrats and policy 
experts try to learn from past experiences and design effective transitional administrations for 
war-torn and contested territories. In a similar vein, Alex Veit and Klaus Schlichte argue that in 
order to fully understand organizational behavior in the field of peace operations, the complex 
interplay of three interconnected arenas needs to be analyzed: 1) multilateral negotiation and 
decision-making among nation states; 2) the interpretation and concretization of these decisions 
within an international organization’s central bureaucracy; and 3) their execution by field 
personnel.15  
What these few examples demonstrate is that the analysis of international organizations 
in world politics can clearly benefit from an explicit organizational research perspective. This is 
particularly true for the analysis of peace operations. Central to this organizational research 
perspective is a focus on organizational change in general and on administrative reform in 
particular. In the first section, the authors will briefly outline the contours of this slowly 
emerging research program that analyzes international bureaucracies as dynamic organizations 
rather than as static instruments of intergovernmental policymaking. The second section narrows 
down the analytical focus to the question of administrative reform in international organizations. 
Building on the results of a set of case studies on the United Nations, the European Commission, 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other international 
organizations, this section develops a set of hypotheses about the substance, timing, and the 
potential outcomes of administrative reforms in international organizations under varying 
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conditions and in different organizational environments. By falling back on these well-
established case studies, this chapter lays the grounds for transferring these insights to the 
organizational setting of peace operations. The third section of the chapter concludes with four 
generalized recommendations as to how researchers and practitioners should proceed in order to 
improve the understanding of administrative reforms in international bureaucracies in general 
and in peace operations in particular. With its focus on organizational reform, this chapter serves 
as a theoretical complement to chapter 1 by Berthoin Antal, Junk, and Schumann in this volume, 
which focuses on organizational learning. 
 
International Bureaucracies as Formal Organizations: Contours of an Emerging Research 
Program 
Although international organizations have been the focus of scholarly interest for many years, 
there is still little systematic understanding of the factors and conditions that determine changes 
of their internal administrative structure.16 On the one hand, international relations (IR) has 
treated international organizations primarily as a sort of a device or platform for 
intergovernmental decision-making rather than as actors in their own right. International 
organizations were conceived of as the deliberate creation of dominant nation states and were 
assumed to emerge, change, and eventually disappear as a result of these states’ strategic 
interests and preferences. By contrast, the bureaucratic interior of international organizations 
deliberately remained outside the analytical focus of much of the IR literature. This neglect was 
justified by the empirical observation that until the end of the 1980s, the role and performance of 
international organizations, in particular the United Nations, was determined predominantly by 
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the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and, only to a very small 
extent, by the internal bureaucratic dynamics of these organizations.  
On the other hand, the sub-disciplines of public administration and policy analysis, which 
typically place great emphasis on the understanding of administrative structures and dynamics, 
have also shown surprisingly little interest in the internal workings of intergovernmental 
organizations. Even comparative studies of administrative reform tend to ignore international 
organizations and focus solely on the similarities and differences between national administrative 
systems.17 The only international organization that so far has received significant attention from 
public administration scholars is the European Union. What could be termed the “public 
administration turn” of studying the European Union18 has provided us with a number of 
important insights into the internal dynamics of the European Commission and its effects on 
supranational institution-building and domestic policy outcomes.19 And even though the interest 
in the European Commission as a supranational administration originated in the 1970s,20 it is 
only since the dramatic resignation of the Commission under the Presidency of Jacques Santer in 
1999 that the issue of administrative reform in the European Commission has received wider 
academic attention.21 In other words, despite interest in the EU administration, the literature on 
international organizations is characterized by a significant lack of empirical case studies about 
administrative reforms in international organizations. 
The need for a more systematic research program that explicitly treats international 
organizations as independent actors in order to better understand their behavior and that is 
genuinely interested in their specific quality as organizations or bureaucracies, has been 
expressed before.22 However, only in the last years do we see the gradual emergence of a more 
comprehensive set of studies that explicitly treats international bureaucracies as formal 
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organizations.23 The main characteristics of this “organizational turn in international organization 
theory”24 are: 
 
1. International organizations are seen as (partially) independent actors in international 
politics. 
2. As such, their actions and, therefore, their contribution to processes of international 
governance are determined not only by external factors, but also by their internal 
structures and dynamics. In other words, “organizations themselves are important units of 
analysis, precisely because they take on a life and character of their own.”25 
3. In order to reach a better understanding of these internal processes, international 
organizations should be analyzed as formal organizations, thereby making use of the 
analytical perspectives and tools of public administration and organization research. In 
particular, organizational analysis of international administrations should explain how, 
why, and to what effect administrative reform takes place. 
 
In sum, what is at stake in this emerging research program is a partial shift of focus from the 
organization to the organizations of the international system.26  Ideally, this emerging research 
program would go hand-in-hand with a more systematic exchange of information between 
practitioners in international organizations and academics studying the internal structures and 
dynamics of these organizations. Such an exchange of information would need to work both 
ways, with practitioners providing inside information to academic researchers and, at the same 
time, using the findings of scholarly research for improving the performance of the individual 
organization. An important element of such a dialogue between scholars and practitioners could 
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be the systematic comparison of individual instances of administrative reform in international 
organizations. In the remainder of this chapter, the authors will try to open the “black box” of 
intergovernmental organizations by presenting the comparative findings of eleven case studies of 
administrative reforms in international bureaucracies (conducted by both academics and 
practitioners), and, as a result, they develop a preliminary set of hypotheses about their causes 
and mechanisms. These case studies explore the administrative reform processes within a variety 
of international organizations, namely, the United Nations, the World Bank, the World Food 
Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), the OECD, the European Commission, the European Parliament’s General 
Secretariat, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Nordic Council, and the Council of Baltic Sea 
States. 
By focusing on a broad range of examples of administrative reform rather than restricting 
this review to those cases that can ex-ante be identified as instances of organizational learning, 
the authors hope to get a more complete and unbiased picture of the factors that increase or 
reduce the potential for internal reform in international organizations and that can be transferred 
to the study of the organizational dimension of peace operations.  
The authors focus on the determinants of administrative reform rather than on the 
substantive proposals of what could or should be reformed in international peacekeeping 
operations.  They are convinced that the biggest obstacle to reform in international organizations 
is not the lack of innovative proposals about what could be improved, but the lack of strategic 
knowledge on how to actually implement some of the existing reform proposals. In other words, 
the authors agree with Edward C. Luck’s argument that scholars and practitioners “might utilize 
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their time more productively in thinking through how to advance existing proposals than in 
developing new ones that have little chance of implementation.”27  
 
Administrative Reform in International Bureaucracies: Empirical Findings 
As the authors argued in the previous section, scholarly understanding of administrative reforms 
in international organizations, both in theoretical and empirical terms, is still rather limited and 
few theoretical attempts have been made to link the findings of existing studies to broader and 
more general theories in the fields of organizational studies and public administration. This 
research gap is particularly pronounced in the study of United Nations peace operations where 
scholars are only very reluctantly beginning to address the issue of administrative reform in the 
UN peacekeeping bureaucracy and to explore its causes and effects. At the same time, the long 
history of failed attempts to reform the UN bureaucracy underscores the need for a more 
systematic identification of the opportunities for and the obstacles to intentionally changing the 
organizational structure of international organizations.28 In this section, the authors will, 
therefore, identify in an explorative manner the most important factors that have been found to 
either foster or hamper attempts to reform the administrative structure of international 
organizations and develop a set of hypotheses about how these factors may or may not translate 
into administrative reform. In addition to the aforementioned eleven original case studies, the 
authors will draw on additional empirical studies from the gradually emerging literature on 
internal structural change in international organizations.  
Administrative reform can be caused by internal or external factors.29 In the following 
sections, the authors will apply this distinction for a first systematization of their empirical 
material.  
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The Influence of External Factors 
External factors comprise those influences that emerge from the organization’s broader 
environment. In most of the case studies analyzed, external factors were found to be an 
important, albeit not the only, source of administrative reform. This finding is in line with 
previous research, most notably a series of case studies on change in the internal decision-
making procedures of intergovernmental organizations conducted by Robert W. Cox and Harold 
K. Jacobson and colleagues which found external forces, especially nation states, to be the single 
most important causal factors.30  
The authors distinguish two types of external factors that may cause or inhibit 
administrative reform in international organizations. These are effects of the organizational 
domain, that is the specific structure and the actor constellations of the policy areas where an 
international organization operates, and effects of a changing constituency, that is the 
constellation of an international organization’s member states. 
 
Organizational Domain: The Structure of the Policy Sector 
The findings from the eleven case studies indicate that the organizational environment in which 
international organizations operate can have an important impact on the occurrence or non-
occurrence of administrative reforms. This causal relationship, however, goes beyond a mere 
mechanistic linkage of domain changes leading to respective organizational responses. Such an 
assumption would not only mean overlooking the fact that organizations may have considerable 
autonomy from their environment and are capable of shaping and affecting this environment,31 
but. it also neglects – and this is the central argument the authors are able to induct from the 
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various cases studies – the fact that specific characteristics of the organizational domain affect its 
influence on administrative reform. 
Of particular importance in this respect is the homogeneity of the organizational domain. 
It makes a difference whether an international organization fulfills very narrowly- defined tasks 
within a rather homogeneous organizational environment or whether the organization is active in 
a variety of different sectors, implying that it operates within a much more heterogeneous 
domain. Modeling the relationship between an organization and its relevant environment in 
terms of a “signaling game,”32 the authors expect an organization to receive clearer and less 
ambiguous signals (for example, to reform in order to combat organizational deficits) if it 
operates in a homogenous domain than is the case for organizations operating in a more 
heterogeneous domain. In the latter case, it is quite conceivable that organizations receive 
contradictory signals and, hence, remain more hesitant when deciding upon respective changes. 
To illustrate this point a bit further, it is helpful to consider the examples of the European 
Central Bank, the United Nations, the European Commission, and the OECD. The ECB has a 
single major task and operates in a professional environment of great homogeneity (as regards 
the efficiency-driven norms and concepts of the economic sector) in which management 
standards are generally undisputed and well-accepted. As a result, it is hardly surprising that the 
ECB has undertaken considerable reform of its internal management practices and, hence, 
responded to the rather clear signals from its domain.33 The United Nations, the European 
Commission, the OECD, and other organizations engaged in the large- scale rebuilding of states 
through peace operations, by contrast, are responsible for a huge variety of outputs and, hence, 
are confronted with highly-differentiated environments. Against this backdrop, it comes as no 
surprise that those organizations have for many years been and, in the OECD case, still are 
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reform laggards.34 This becomes particularly clear in the case of the UN where successive 
failures to improve interdepartmental coordination mechanisms and information flows or to 
reform human resource management35 correspond with an extremely complex and heterogeneous 
organizational environment.36 Based on these considerations, the authors formulate the following 
two hypotheses: 
 
1. Hypothesis 1: The extent to which changes in the organizational domain trigger 
administrative reforms in international organizations depends on the degree of domain 
homogeneity. The more homogeneous the organizational environment, the more the 
authors expect far-reaching and swift changes in order to close potential gaps to 
developments in the organizational domain. By contrast, the great heterogeneity of the 
organizational domain that characterizes the United Nations in general, and UN peace 
operations in particular, can be expected to constitute a significant obstacle to 
administrative reform, especially if this reform is aimed at a better coordination between 
the different levels of the organizational hierarchy or between the different UN agencies 
operating in different policy areas.37 and 
2. Hypothesis 2: Domain heterogeneity can be expected to increase with the number of tasks 
for which an organization is responsible.  The speed and scope of administrative reforms 
should be more pronounced in single-purpose organizations, for example, the European 
Central Bank, than in multi-purpose organizations, for example, the UN as a whole, as 
well as individual peace operations. 
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Due to their aforementioned three-tiered structure,38 the organizational environment of UN peace 
operations is characterized by a particularly high degree of complexity and heterogeneity. The 
different political arenas within which peace operations are located – the central UN 
bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the field offices, on the other – may send diverging signals 
and, consequently, obstruct the chances for administrative reform. A case in point is the direct 
transfer of the administrative model of the international administration in Kosovo to East Timor, 
a decision made by UN headquarters in New York. Although the administrative model 
developed in Kosovo was soon regarded as inadequate to the situation in East Timor, UN field 
officials did not succeed in adapting it to the Timorese reality.39 
 
Organizational Constituency: The Member States 
In addition to the characteristics of an organization's domain, one might expect similar influences 
emerging from the nature of its constituency. Do the reform orientations and reform 
developments in the member states of an international organization make a difference in terms of 
administrative reforms? Furthermore, does it make a difference whether the member states 
reflect a rather homogenous group in terms of socio-economic and political conditions? 
Interestingly, the evidence of the cases analyzed by the authors does not support these 
expectations. There seems to be no clear and straightforward linkage between constituency 
characteristics and administrative reform developments. For instance, reform developments in 
the ECB and the European Commission differ sharply, notwithstanding the fact that they have 
almost the same constituency.40 In addition, the authors found that administrative reform in the 
European Commission is more pronounced than within the OECD, although in the OECD there 
is a higher number of member states that can be classified as pioneer states of public 
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management reforms.41  The authors, thus, expected much more reform activity in the OECD 
than in the European Commission. These findings are rather surprising from the perspective of 
intergovernmentalist approaches,42 which expect that international organizations are highly 
responsive to the interests of their members. However, they do confirm the findings of a study by 
Michael Barnett and Liv Coleman who argue that the way in which an international organization 
responds to its external constituency depends to an important degree on the “congruity between 
the organizational culture and the content of the environmental pressures.”43 In their study on 
organizational change in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Barnett 
and Coleman found that marked differences between INTERPOL’s organizational identity and 
the external demands of nation states to focus more strongly on political crimes led the 
organization to adopt strategies of avoidance or defiance, thus refuting external demands for 
organizational and programmatic change. INTERPOL only gave up its opposition to the 
demands of its constituency when states started to create new international organizations to 
fulfill the desired functions which, in turn, threatened INTERPOL’s organizational standing in 
the area of crime control and prevention. Melanie Schreiner et al. in chapter 9 of this volume 
identify in their analysis of organizational learning in the Liberian peace operations community a 
similar impact of organizational identity. However, while Barnett and Coleman found a strong 
and homogeneous organizational identity to partially immunize international organizations 
against external demands, Schreiner et al. argue that it also increases their internal capacity for 
strategic learning and problem-solving and, thus, seems to be an important determinant for 
organizational change from within.  
While the nature of the constituency appears to have an ambiguous impact and is strongly 
dependent on further intervening factors such as “organizational security,”44 the opposite is the 
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case when it comes to changes in the constituency. Several case studies report strong increases in 
reform activities as a result of such changes. This holds true not only for the respective 
developments in the Nordic Council (where membership decreased),45 but also in the European 
Commission and the European Parliament, where prospects of enlargement constituted an 
important driving force for administrative reforms.46 Similar evidence is presented by Dimitris 
Bourantonis in his account of UN Security Council reform. In his historical study, he found that 
the increasing size of the UN’s membership was the single most important factor pressing for 
change in the composition of the Security Council. Regarding the reason for the 1963 reform that 
lead to an increase in the number of Security Council members, he writes that “(t)he dramatic 
increase in UN membership, which continued unabated until 1963, upset the ratio of the total 
number of members of the UN to the number of seats in the Security Council and brought about 
pressures for a reconsideration of the original composition of the Security Council and, more 
particularly, its non-permanent category.”47. Another prominent example where significant 
changes in the UN membership triggered reform initiatives is the Jackson Report on the United 
Nations Development System.48 This administrative capacity study was a direct response to the 
accession of a large number of developing countries that had gained independence from their 
former colonial powers in the course of the 1960s and the related substantial increase in the UN 
system’s development budget projected for the coming years.49 Finally, UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace50 – which offered recommendations 
on ways of strengthening and making more efficient the UN’s capacity for preventive diplomacy, 
peace-making, and peacekeeping – followed a rapid increase in UN membership. In this case, 
however, as in other reform initiatives in the area of UN peace operations, situational factors 
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such as the end of the Cold War and actual performance deficits clearly played a more important 
role as triggers of reform. 
The great influence of an increase in the number of member states on change and reform 
in international organizations is also supported by the path breaking empirical study on decision-
making in international organizations by Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson et al. In an 
early overview of this and other studies on change and reform in international organizations, 
Lawrence S. Finkelstein comes to the conclusion that “(t)he greatest motor of change (…) has 
been the generation of new states which have both altered the composition and voting balances 
of the international organizations they joined in a massive influx and also posed a new agenda of 
problems to be dealt with.”51  
In this context, however, it should be emphasized that constituency changes per se may 
only be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for triggering reforms. As indicated in the case 
studies, increases or decreases in membership were typically linked to the perception among the 
member states of existing performance deficits which were expected to further increase with 
membership changes.52 Consequently, for the European Central Bank, due to its absolute 
independence from its constituency and its high degree of agenda-setting power, “(e)nlargement 
(…) has not proved to be a catalyst for transformative institutional change.”53 Similarly, Dimitris 
Bourantonis’ study of UN Security Council reform shows that increases in the number of UN 
member states do not automatically result in organizational change and reform. Due to the strong 
resistance of the permanent Security Council members, on the one hand, and disagreement 
among the reform-oriented member states on the other, an increase in the number of member 
states in the 1990s and a widely-shared desire for reform did not result in further changes to the 
size or composition of the Security Council.54 
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These considerations suggest the following two hypotheses on constituency effects: 
 
1. Hypothesis 1: The characteristics of an international organization's constituency (in 
particular, with regard to homogeneity of public management orientations and socio-
economic and political conditions) have no significant effect on the speed and scope of 
management reforms in the organization.  
2. Hypothesis 2: The speed and scope of administrative reforms in international 
organizations increase with the extent to which pre-existing concerns on performance 
gaps coincide with changes in the organization's constituency. In the case of the United 
Nations, such a coincidence of changes in priorities and interests of member states and an 
awareness of existing performance deficits was found, for example, in the area of 
development assistance. In the future, however, a significant growth of UN membership 
is rather improbable. Consequently, impetus for change can be expected from changes in 
the relative power or the interests of member states, rather than from changes in their 
number.  
 
The Influence of Internal Factors 
Whether or not international organizations change their internal administrative structures is also 
affected by factors that are endogenous to the organization in question, including the nature of 
the organization, its size, its leadership and internal politics, its organizational culture and 
identity, as well as the internal origin of reform attempts. 
 
The nature of the organization: supranational vs. intergovernmental 
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It seems plausible that the nature of an organization and, in particular, its status as a 
supranational or intergovernmental body, has an impact on respective administrative reforms. 
This argument is based on the assumption that supranational organizations have a higher degree 
of autonomy from their members than is the case for their intergovernmental counterparts. As a 
consequence, a much higher responsiveness from intergovernmental organizations to changes in 
their member states' preferences should be expected; hence, also implying that the speed and 
scope of administrative reforms should be more pronounced than in supranational organizations. 
This expectation, however, is not supported by the case studies. On the contrary, rather 
far-reaching reforms were found in the ECB,55 the European Parliament56 and, with some delay, 
in the European Commission.57  Reforms in intergovernmental organizations, however, remained 
rather piecemeal and were certainly not more pronounced than those in the supranational bodies 
studied.58. 
How can this puzzling finding be explained? The authors argue that there is no 
contradiction to existing theories in which the degree of organizational autonomy is seen as an 
important factor affecting the policymaking capacity and policy impact of international 
organizations. It is hardly disputed that a supranational organization, such as the European 
Commission, in contrast to intergovernmental organizations, enjoys a considerable degree of 
autonomy and, hence, has independent influence on policymaking within the European Union.59 
(However, while autonomy may make an important difference for an organization's role in 
policymaking, this need not necessarily be the case when it comes to questions of internal 
operational autonomy and internal affairs.60  It is well conceivable that member states leave to 
international organizations (regardless of their status as either supranational or intergovernmental 
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bodies) rather broad leeway, as these issues do not directly interfere with their domestic or 
foreign policy interests.  
Indeed, various case studies underline that while the level of autonomy as regards policy 
delivery of international organizations may vary, virtually all organizations appear to be rather 
independent when it comes to the regulation of their internal administrative affairs. Hence, the 
supranational or intergovernmental nature of international organizations seems to be of limited 
relevance when accounting for the speed and scope of reforms of their administrative structure. 
Hypothesis: The nature of an international organization (in particular, its status as 
supranational or intergovernmental body) has no significant effect on the speed and scope of 
management reforms in the organization. 
 
Organizational size 
The extant literature on change in international organizations also suggests that the size of an 
international organization has an impact on the scope as well as the procedural patterns of 
administrative reforms. In this context, size is not only a matter of the number of staff per se, 
which can range from some dozens to several thousand civil servants, but is also closely related 
to the extent to which international organizations have been designed for single or multiple tasks.  
More specifically, the smaller an organization is, the less likely it will be able to 
independently influence its organizational environment. Consequently, small organizations may 
be much more responsive to developments and challenges emerging in their domain. 
Administrative reforms in smaller, international organizations, therefore, should be more likely 
to reflect a pattern of continuous incremental adaptations. Tobias Etzold’s case study on 
reorganization processes in the Nordic Council illustrates the assumption that smaller 
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organizations, with a rather limited spectrum of responsibilities, are more responsive to their 
environment and, therefore, are more apt to respond to changing requirements through 
incremental, but continuous internal reforms.61 
For larger organizations, by contrast, reform patterns may reflect a less responsive 
pattern, assuming that these organizations either have a more autonomous position towards their 
environment as a result of their higher influence in their domain or that these huge bureaucratic 
entities are just less apt to adapt quickly to changing requirements. In a historical account of 
administrative reform initiatives in the UN Secretariat from its creation through the 1980s, W. 
Andy Knight finds that “the reform of the Secretariat has been among one of the most difficult 
tasks because of the resistance such efforts encounter from the UN staff members, some member 
state representatives and the International Civil Service Commission.“62 
The reform patterns of large international organizations will, hence, reveal a less 
continuous, but also less incremental pattern. As larger organizations can afford to leave a bigger 
gap between their own structures and their environment, reforms, when actually perceived as 
being necessary, are more likely to go beyond merely piecemeal adjustments. This can be 
expected at least in terms of reform rhetoric, leaving issues of deficient implementation aside. 
The much delayed, but far-reaching “Kinnock reform” of the European Commission, which only 
became possible when the Commission came under severe legitimating pressures, serves as a 
prominent example of this pattern.63  
Hypothesis: The smaller an international organization is in terms of size, the more 
responsive it is to changes in its environment, implying that administrative reforms follow a 
pattern of continuous and incremental adjustments.  
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Leadership and internal politics 
The adoption and implementation of administrative reforms require a certain degree of consensus 
among the actors involved. This consensus, however, can hardly be expected to emerge “out-of-
the–blue,” as reforms, in many instances, are highly contested between potential reform 
beneficiaries and reform opponents seeking to preserve the status quo or favoring other reform 
options and directions. 
Against this background, successful reformers are not only required to build coalitions 
for achieving the necessary majorities in the decision-making process, they also have to ensure 
the compliance of important stakeholders during the implementation stage. Successful 
administrative reforms in international organizations are strongly dependent upon the strategic 
and tactical capabilities of their leadership in order to overcome internal resistance to change. In 
other words, internal reform processes matter for the magnitude of administrative reform, and the 
design of these processes is strongly affected by the existence of committed political 
entrepreneurs within the organization and their leadership skills.64 A comparison of the 
successive UN Secretaries-General shows that leadership skills and norm entrepreneurship vary 
considerably among these office holders and these  attributes can be decisive for the success of a 
variety of reform efforts.65  A case in point is Ian Johnstone’s account of UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan’s entrepreneurship in establishing the United Nations responsibility to protect norm. 
Johnstone argues that without the strong engagement and the skillful leadership of Kofi Annan, 
this conceptual basis for modern peace operations may not have been adopted in its present 
form.66 Thorsten Benner et al. in chapter 10 support this argument. In their analysis of 
organizational learning in the UN peace operations bureaucracy they argue that “(a)n active 
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‘supporter’ or an effective ‘leadership alliance’ appear to be key factors” in organizational 
learning processes and in driving “a certain lesson toward its institutionalization.”67  
Four decades ago, Robert W. Cox already pointed to the importance of leadership for 
organizational change in intergovernmental organizations noting that "(t)he quality of executive 
leadership may prove to be the most critical single determinant of the growth in scope and 
authority of international organization(s)."68 The relevance of this argument becomes apparent 
throughout the literature on change and reform in international bureaucracies, but is most 
pronounced and empirically-demonstrated in a comparative study by Soo Mee Baumann, Markus 
Hagel, and Barbara Kobler on the role of “reform brokers” in the modernization of eight 
international organizations.69 This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: The speed and scope of administrative reform in international organizations 
increases the more committed and skillful leadership exists within the organization. This applies 
both to universal international organizations, such as the United Nations as a whole, and to sub-
organizations, such as transitional administrations established by the United Nations in post-
conflict territories. 
 
The impact of organizational crisis 
What is the impact of organizational crisis on the speed and scope of administrative reforms? 
Case studies indicate that there is no straightforward relationship between crisis perception and 
reform. This can be traced to three aspects: 
 
1. While the existence of a crisis can be seen as an important condition for administrative 
reforms to take place, this does not automatically lead to the actual adoption of respective 
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reforms. There may still be powerful actors within the organization who successfully 
oppose reform proposals. 
2. It is well conceivable, and often the case, that organizations reform themselves in the 
absence of crisis. Change without crisis can either occur because organizations anticipate 
potential problems in the future or react to them at an early stage. Moreover, change 
without crisis can occur as a result of isomorphic adjustments to developments in the 
organizational environment. In the case studies analyzed, reform in organizations were 
rarely seen in the face of open crisis, but, rather, in response to organizational changes 
within their peer group or as a pre-emptive measure in view of alternations in their 
environment. In other words, questions of organizational legitimacy seem to be more 
important than issues of functional performance in order to bring about organizational 
change.70 This point is driven home by various case studies; in particular, Tim Balint and 
Christoph Knill’s analysis of the reform of human resource management in the OECD,71 
Tobias Etzold’s study on reorganization processes in the Nordic Council and the Council 
of the Baltic Sea States,72 Michael Kerler’s analysis of administrative reform at the World 
Bank,73 and Veith Mehde’s account of administrative reforms as a means to enhance the 
legitimacy of the European Commission.74 From a realist or a principal-agent 
perspective, this finding may be surprising. But if one takes into account that legitimacy 
is on one of the major sources of international organization (IO) authority,75 and a 
principal reason why states regularly seek the mandate of an international organization 
before engaging in critical actions, such as peace enforcement operations,76 it becomes 
apparent that the quest for international legitimacy constitutes an important source of 
organizational change. 
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3. The link between crisis and reform is further complicated by the fact that the very nature 
of organizational crisis matters. As argued by Tim Balint and Christoph Knill, it makes a 
difference whether a crisis stems from a kind of dissatisfaction with the performance of 
an international organization or whether it is the result of a search for a new 
organizational identity and mission.77 In the case of performance challenges, one would 
expect administrative reforms to be seen as useful devices to improve the situation. Johan 
P. Olsen, therefore, rightly characterizes performance crises as useful “reality checks.”78 
Cases in point are the failures of peace operations in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Somalia in the course of the 1990s which constituted the single most important 
trigger for the far-reaching structural and programmatic reforms proposed in the Report 
of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the so-called “Brahimi Report.”79 
Organizational identity crises, by contrast, may have a paralyzing effect.80  Without a 
clear idea of the future mission of an organization, reform momentum may easily be lost. 
Would-be reformers do not know with certainty what is most important to focus on and 
where to start improvement. An example of how an internationally-operating 
organization can be paralyzed when its core function is openly disputed is given by 
Michael Barnett and Liv Coleman in their study on organizational change at 
INTERPOL.81 
 
Hypothesis: The extent to which the existence or perception of crises affects administrative 
reforms in international organizations depends on the nature of the crisis. The more crises are 
linked to the organization’s very identity (implying that its core functions are disputed) rather 
than mere operational performance gaps, the more diminished the organization’s capability of 
 388 
 
responding swiftly and comprehensively to the challenges. The more a crisis affects an 
organization’s core, the lesser the likelihood that crisis actually triggers systematic reform 
endeavors. 
 
Political vs. administrative origin of organizational reforms 
A fundamental dichotomy that may affect results, goals, and processes of administrative reforms 
refers to the question of whether these reforms are initiated predominantly by administrative 
actors or by political leaders within the organization in question. As political and administrative 
actors may pursue rather different reform objectives and be guided by different interests, it seems 
plausible that this distinction has an impact on the speed, scope, and the very character of 
administrative reforms. 
Administrative reformers seem to be concerned primarily with issues of functional 
performance. This implies that reforms dominated by the administration of an international 
organization are more directed towards incremental adjustments in order to improve and 
optimize the organization’s operative capacities. If, by contrast, reforms are politically driven, 
issues of legitimacy towards the organizational environment rather than aspects of functional 
performance may play a dominant role. Moreover, as politicians generally have an incentive to 
demonstrate a profound impact of their activities, they strive for more fundamental rather than 
piecemeal developments. At the same time, however, the potential ignorance towards functional 
issues may imply that one-sided political reforms may suffer from far-reaching implementation 
problems if they are not supported by the administration. As a consequence, there is a higher 
potential that politically-driven reforms will, instead, remain at a symbolic level, with 
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fundamental reform announcements being trimmed down to minor changes during the 
implementation stage. These considerations suggest the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis: The more administrative reforms of international organizations are 
dominated by administrative actors, the more incremental changes will be observed in order to 
improve functional performance. By contrast, the more reforms are driven by political actors, the 
higher the probability of more fundamental reform attempts in order to increase an 
organization’s external legitimacy. 
Hypothesis: The more political actors dominate administrative reforms of international 
organizations, the higher the likelihood of implementation deficits, given the gap between 
political legitimacy concerns and issues of functional performance advocated by the 
organization’s administration. 
 
Conclusions 
This account of the causes and conditions of administrative reforms in international 
bureaucracies is primarily an explorative exercise. Based on a set of case studies of 
administrative reforms in international organizations, the generalizations and preliminary 
hypotheses presented here are attempts to gather facts, systematize observable patterns, and 
propose possible explanations for the wide array of organizational reforms that are regularly 
observed at the international level. In other words, the results presented here are the starting 
point for future discussion rather than a synthesis to settle competing claims and theories. 
In view of this explorative character of the authors’ analysis, this chapter concludes with 
four recommendations as to where, in their opinion, researchers interested in analyzing the 
planning and implementation of peace operations as well as practitioners in that field may want 
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to focus their work and what they should keep in mind in order to further improve the 
understanding of administrative reforms of international organizations. 
 
Invest in Good Description 
First, and above all, more reliable empirical data on the phenomenon of administrative reform in 
international bureaucracies is needed. There is an unjustified disdain in contemporary social 
science for describing political events. While the primary aim of social sciences is to make 
causal inferences, it should not be forgotten that causal explanations need to be based on 
sufficient and adequate description. However, with respect to explaining administrative reform in 
international organizations, there is still not enough known about the factual and potential cases 
for developing already well-specified concepts and general explanations. In particular, better 
tools are needed for evaluating and comparing the speed and scope of administrative reform. 
Furthermore, more is needed to be known about the various elements of administrative reforms 
(financial-budgetary, personnel and institutional) and their respective importance for 
organizational change on the whole. Thus, more research is needed on ways to optimize 
categories of change and on exact operationalizations in order to relate empirical observations 
more precisely to theoretical concepts. Good description is an indispensable requirement for the 
development of sound theories. The emergence of an “organizational turn” in the study of 
international organizations may provide the necessary impetus for political science scholarship to 
broaden the empirical foundation for a better understanding of processes of organizational 
change in international bureaucracies. 
For practitioners, this means that more time should be invested in trying to understand 
why past reform attempts have succeeded or failed. Instead of developing new reform ideas, 
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practitioners should focus on improving the conditions for the successful implementation of 
existing ones. Although many of the determinants of administrative reform in the international 
organizations identified in this chapter are structural in nature, and thus cannot be actively 
changed, reform entrepreneurs within or outside the organization can derive valuable cues for 
future action from a systematic analysis of the obstacles to previous reform attempts. 
 
Focus on the Actors 
A further challenge is to connect macro-level reform change with micro-level behavior of real 
world human actors. The understanding of individual actors’ preferences, their utility functions 
as well as the implications of culturally- or nationally- bound behavioral patterns, is still very 
limited. For example, it may be that culture and nationality are not significant factors since such 
differences are business-as-usual for transnational administrative elites like the cosmopolitically-
educated and socialized workforce of international organizations. However, as mentioned above, 
the case studies analyzed suggest that reform promoters often have a background of a particular 
administrative reform culture through their experience in their ”home country.” In fact, little is 
known about whether, and to what extent, particular role understanding, images of political 
order, particular career paths (predominant national or international socialization), particular 
patterns of staff representation and unionization, and flexible or rigid career structures actually 
affect administrative reforms in international organizations. This intra-organizational level of 
analysis has so far been widely neglected in the study of international organizations. 
 
Encourage Dialogue between the Sub-disciplines 
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It would be a huge mistake to analyze administrative reforms in international bureaucracies only 
from the perspective of distinctive academic sub-disciplines. Rather, the challenge is to identify 
common ground and to combine tools, theories, and explanations from the various related sub-
disciplines (i.e, public administration, international relations, organization theory, and political 
science). However, as it stands now, a problematic division of labor is seen among the 
disciplines where “international lawyers remain hard at work proposing new IOs or proposing 
institutional reforms to correct the 'birth defects' of the IOs that we now have,”82 while scholars 
of international relations continue to play down or even deny the autonomous agency of 
intergovernmental organizations as well as their independent influence on international 
governance processes. Political scientists and IR scholars who are acquainted with the driving 
forces of organizational reform in international administrations as well as the political and 
institutional obstacles that prevent an optimal design of international organizations could 
contribute a more cautious note to the often overly optimistic debate among national 
policymakers and international lawyers. 
 
Do Not Lose Sight of the “So What” Question 
Finally, the authors encourage researchers intending to explore the field of administrative 
reforms of international organizations not to lose sight of the “so what” question. In other words, 
we should not stop at describing and explaining organizational change as the dependent variable. 
It is rather an important step of further research to take administrative reforms of international 
organizations as the independent variable and ask what difference particular patterns of reforms 
make for actual policy outputs and policy outcomes. If we know more about these relationships, 
the discussion of organizational change in international bureaucracies could be fruitfully linked 
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to questions of policymaking under the conditions of multilevel governance that are of crucial 
importance for policy analysts, organizational sociologists, and scholars of international relations 
as well as professionals and politicians. 
 
In sum, this chapter has attempted to systematize empirical findings on the determinants of 
administrative reform in international bureaucracies. So far, the study of change in international 
organizations has focused either on the institutional rules of intergovernmental decision-making 
or on the substantive goals and programs of international organizations. Administrative reform 
within the bureaucratic apparatus of international organizations, by contrast, is only beginning to 
attract the attention of scholars in the fields of public administration and international relations. 
This is especially true for the analysis of UN peace operations. Only belatedly are scholars 
paying closer attention to the administrative underpinnings of peace operations and the ways in 
which administrative reforms both within the UN bureaucracy and within individual 
peacekeeping programs can improve their performance. By summarizing insights from empirical 
studies of administrative reform in a variety of international organizations and across a wide 
range of policy areas, this chapter aims to contribute to the emerging literature. However, instead 
of developing concrete proposals for reforming the organizational basis of UN peace operations, 
this chapter presented inductively-derived generalizations and preliminary hypotheses about the 
determinants of and obstacles to organizational change in international organizations. As such, 
the results, on the one hand, constitute a starting point for practitioners in their attempt to 
improve the organizational foundations of UN peace operations and, on the other hand, provide a 
set of hypotheses that can be further tested and refined by scholars of public administration and 
international relations.
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